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Abstract:  
Polygyny is an institution with deep roots in West Africa. Many papers have attempted to 
explain the rationality and persistence of this phenomenon through time. Less effort has 
been devoted to studying the effect of polygyny on household economic behavior. This 
question is policy relevant given the pressure underway to eliminate polygyny. This 
paper provides new empirical evidence on whether polygyny leads to an improvement or 
a worsening of intra-household efficiency for three countries with high levels of polygyny: 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal. The e 
vidence we obtain is mixed. In Benin, polygyny does not seem to have an impact on 
intra-household efficiency, while it appears, in the longer run, to improve it in Burkina 
Faso, but to decrease it in Senegal. 
 
Keywords: Polygamy, Efficiency, Agriculture, Africa 
 
JEL Classification: D13, D79, J12, O13, O55 
 
1 Introduction
Polygyny is an institution with deep roots in West Africa.1 It is socially accepted in more than
half of the countries in this region.2 The percentage of men that are polygamists reaches 37% in
Guinea and 35% in Gambia. Many papers have attempted to explain the determinants and per-
sistence of this phenomenon through time (e.g. Boserup, 1970; Becker, 1974; Grossbard, 1978;
Bergstrom, 1994; Jacoby, 1995; Gould et al., 2008). Less e¤ort has been devoted to studying
the e¤ects of polygyny on household economic behavior. One noteworthy exception is the pa-
per by Tertilt (2005), which shows that polygyny crowds-out investments in physical assets and
increases fertility, suggesting that polygyny is bad for development. Akresh, Chen and More
(2012a,b) and Dauphin, Fortin and Lacroix (2011) are the only papers in the economics literature
as of now to study whether polygamous households behave e¢ ciently. How polygyny impacts in-
trahousehold e¢ ciency is policy relevant given the strong pressure put on countries to eliminate
polygyny.3 Knowledge of the e¤ect of the monogamy versus polygamy status on the e¢ ciency of
agricultural decisions in particular is especially important given the crucial role played by agricul-
ture in the livelihood of poor West African households.
Akresh et al. (2012a,b) study the agricultural production of Burkina Faso households and nd
that ine¢ ciency, while present in polygamous households, is less pronounced than in monoga-
mous ones. They ascribe this to the fact that altruism is lower in polygamous marriages, because
wives do not generally care for each other. This, they say, increases the incentive of spouses to
cooperate by lowering the utility they expect to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium. Dauphin
et al. (2011), who test the e¢ ciency of consumption decisions of Burkina Faso households, con-
clude that polygamous households are ine¢ cient. Although they do not test whether monoga-
mous households are less ine¢ cient, they argue that polygamous households should be at least
as ine¢ cient as monogamous households, since they face the same potential sources of ine¢ -
1Polygyny is a form of marriage in which a man has several wives at the same time. Polygamy encompasses
both polygyny and its reverse, polyandry, in which a woman has more than one husband.
2This gure is based on the 2009 OECD Gender Institution and Development database.
3Article 16 of the UN Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) prohibits
polygamy.
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ciency, such as di¢ culties enforcing the marriage contract (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, 2003;
Ligon et al., 2002; Basu, 2006), information asymmetry between the spouses (Bloch and Rao,
2002; Ashraf, 2009), social norms (Udry, 1996; Duo and Udry, 2004), and jealousy between the
wives, which could exacerbate cooperation between the spouses.
Anthropologists have been debating for some time on whether polygyny generates mainly coop-
eration or conicts between the wives. A number of them have argued that polygyny induces co-
operative behavior between wives like the sharing of maternal and domestic responsibilities (e.g.
Steady, 1987; Madhavan, 2002). Others believe that polygyny is mostly conducive to conict-
ing behaviors, ranging from verbal and physical aggression to poisoning (e.g. Flinn and England,
1995; Jankowiak et al., 2005; Kazianga and Klonner, 2009). Some also nd that the tensions it
creates within the household adversely impact the physical and mental health of the wives and
their children (e.g. Arney, 2002; Hadley, 2005; Al-Krenawi and Graham, 2006).
This paper provides new empirical evidence on whether polygyny leads to an improvement in in-
trahousehold e¢ ciency.4 The causal e¤ect of the marital status on the intrahousehold e¢ ciency
of agricultural production is tentatively estimated for three countries where the prevalence of
polygyny is high: Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal. Intrahousehold ine¢ ciency of agricultural
production is assessed following Udry (1996) and Akresh et al. (2012a,b). When possible, two dif-
ferent identication strategies are implemented: an approach based on the recent experience of
households going through a change in its number of wives and an instrumental variable (IV) ap-
proach relying on the relationship between polygyny and ethnicity. Both strategies are used along
with a xed e¤ect approach controlling for unobserved confounders.
We get mixed evidence. In Benin, polygyny does not appear to have an impact on intrahousehold
e¢ ciency. We obtain the same result for Burkina Faso and Senegal with the rst identication
strategy. However, based on the IV approach, polygyny is found to increase intrahousehold e¢ -
ciency in Burkina, but decrease it in Senegal. The diverging results provided by the two identi-
4The marital status of a household can inuence its agricultural production through the quantity and quality
of inputs available to its production and through the use it makes of these inputs. We only focus on the second
possibility in this paper.
3
cation strategies are reconcilable if the e¤ects of polygyny on the intrahousehold e¢ ciency are
only felt in the longer term. But even under this assumption, the longer term e¤ect of polygyny
remains di¤erent in Burkina Faso and Senegal.
The paper is organized as follows; the next section discusses polygyny and family farming in
West Africa. Section 3 briey reviews the implications of intrahousehold e¢ ciency for agricul-
tural decisions. The approach for estimating the causal e¤ect of polygyny is presented in section
4. Section 5 then presents the main empirical features of our samples. Finally, the empirical re-
sults are exposed in Section 6.
2 Polygyny and agriculture in West Africa
As shown in Table 1, male polygyny rates are quite high in West Africa. The proportion of mar-
ried men in union with more than one wife reaches 29% in Benin and Burkina Faso, and 20%
in Senegal. Even in countries where polygyny is outlawed, which is in fact the case in more than
half of the countries in West Africa, polygyny rates are above 15% (with the exception of Liberia).
There are primarily two reasons behind the high rates of polygyny observed in countries where it
is forbidden. First, civil laws against polygyny are not enforced (Tertilt, 2006) and second, polyg-
amous unions are still permitted under customary laws in many of these countries (CEDAW,
2005). In fact, three types of marriage are generally possible in West Africa : traditional, reli-
gious and civil. Each type involves di¤erent rights and obligations. Traditional marriages, which
are usually the most common, do not restrict the number of spouses a man may have. Muslim
marriages limit the number of wives to four, while Catholic marriages authorize only one spouse
(Boyer et al., 1991). However, it is not unusual to encounter a Catholic man who has chosen a
traditional marriage over a Catholic one in order to marry more than one woman.5 In all West
African countries, bigamy is by far the most common form of polygyny.
These high rates of polygyny do not, however, imply that many West African women choose
5 In a survey conducted by the author in Burkina Faso in 1998, 14% of the polygamous men in the sample de-
clared themself to be Catholic. See Dauphin et al. (2011) for more details on this survey.
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polygyny. In fact, women often do not have the right to make any decisions about their own
marriages, it is their families who have this entitlement with the father frequently having the
greatest say (Boyer et al., 1991). Forced marriage is banned in the civil law of many countries,
but once again traditional rules often allow this (CEDAW, 2005). Some women are said to see
polygyny as a good thing because it allows wives to share the burdens of domestic work (Ware,
1979). They may even form a coalition against the husband in some occasions (Bastide, 2012).6
In contrast, many women report not being pleased by the idea of sharing the household resources
with a co-wife (Ware, 1979) and fear that their husband could set them aside for the newer wife
(Jankowiak et al., 2005). Jealousy between co-wives is mentioned in numerous anthropological
papers.7 Tensions can be so high between co-wives that they will accuse each other of witchcraft,
particularly if one of their children dies (Bastide, 2012). Perhaps to deal with the aversion of
the rst wife toward the arrival of a new and younger wife, the social norm in many ethnic so-
cieties is to give the rst wife some prerogatives and authority over the second (Lallemand, 1977;
Rookhuizen, 1986; Bastide, 2012). Furthermore, a rule of rotation between the wives for cook-
ing responsibilities and conjugal obligations is typically in place to ensure, in principle, that the
wives receive equal treatment from their husband (Madhavan, 2002). Is it also common for co-
wives to have their own huts and sometimes even their own kitchens (Wittrup, 1990; Bastide,
2012), again probably with the objective of reducing conicts.
Except for Mauritania, as shown in Table 1, polygyny is more prevalent in rural regions than in
urban ones. One reason for this might be that polygyny is a source of opulence for men when
women and children contribute signicantly to the household wealth, which is the case in rural
agricultural households of West Africa. The important role that women play in agriculture in
Africa is legendary. They are reported to be, in many cases, the main family member respon-
sible for the sowing, weeding, harvesting, transportation and transformation of the crops, leav-
ing the men to do the clearing of the land, as well as the ploughing and spraying (Saito, 1994;
FAO, 2011b). This high division of labor between men and women, combined with the lack of
6This reality is reected in the Nigerian proverb: "Herd unity requires the lion to sleep on an empty stomach."
(Free translation of the author).
7See for example Calame-Griaule (1986), Potash (1989), Wittrup (1990), McIlwraith (1992), Madhavan (2002).
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agricultural labour market for female labour (Fafchamps, 1993; Traoré, 2010; FAO, 2011a), could
make polygyny particularly attractive for agricultural men wanting to increase their workforce
(Boserup, 1970; Singh, 1988; Jacoby, 1995).
Land, a fundamental input for agriculture, is governed in West African countries by state land
laws and by customary land rights which often dominate in rural areas. While the details of tra-
ditional land rights vary within ethnic groups, in general, they all recognize "possession" rights.
That is, ownership falls to the original occupants who initially cleared and exploited the land in
question (Feder and Noronha, 1987). A "landlord"8 is often in charge of controlling the land and
of allocating it to the male members of the lineage (Verdier, 1971). If the land allotted to a man
is insu¢ cient, he may try to borrow some land from another family group. Since individuals may
lose their customary land rights when it is not exploited (Feder and Noronha, 1987), they may
be ready to lend or rent it when it is not being used (Traoré, 2010). Traoré (2010) even reports
a practice of "false elds", which consists of pretending that a eld is cultivated in order not to
lose it. This rule of occupancy governing customary land rights may also encourage polygyny and
fertility (Boserup, 1970). Generally, married women gain access to land through husbands who
have granted them a portion of their own land (Saito, 1994). The literature on women in agri-
culture widely reports that the parcels of land granted to women this way is of low quality.9 In
many Burkina Faso ethnic groups, there are often portions of elds that the husband recently left
fallow due to declining productivity (Traoré and Fourgeau, 2006).
Agricultural households usually cultivate several dispersed parcels of land at the same time. The
parcels are only partially specialized in the production of a crop. The same crops are frequently
cultivated on di¤erent parcels at the same time. Women are mostly active in food crops, while
cash crops are dominated by men. Often, some of the parcels cultivated are called family elds
and others personal elds. The literature on family agriculture organization mentions that all
the members of the household must work on the family elds and that harvests from these are
8The expression in French is "chef de terre".
9See for example, Riss (1989) and Traoré and Fourgeau (2006).
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intended for the consumption of the household and to fulll family obligations.10 Agricultural
operations and the use of the family eld harvests would be subject however to the authority of
the head of the household. Only after having completed their tasks on the family elds would
the other household members be allowed to cultivate their personal elds.11 The priority given
to family elds are reported to delay the timing of agricultural operations on personal elds and
reduces the intensity of their cultivation (Riss, 1989; Traoré, 2010). While wives must help their
husbands with family elds, men may also help their wives with their personal elds, especially
for tasks demanding physical strength. However, mutual aid between co-wives for cultivating
their personal elds does not seem to be frequent (Schlippé, 1956; Traoré, 2010).12 The harvests
of personal elds generally belongs to the cultivator and are partly intended for family consump-
tion and partly for earning income.
This description of the organization of farm households suggests that the allocation of inputs is
governed by social norms potentially in contradiction with the maximization of the households
total agricultural production. This could lead to output loss and make agricultural decisions in-
e¢ cient. It also suggests that polygamous households are not more e¢ cient in allocating their
inputs. The next section proposes testable restrictions of these two assumptions.
3 Assessing intrahousehold e¢ ciency of agricultural decisions
As with Akresh et al. (2012a,b), the approach we follow for assessing the intrahousehold e¢ -
ciency of agricultural production is that proposed by Udry (1996). The advantage of this method
is that the degree of ine¢ ciency is measured, and this allows us to test whether polygamous house-
holds are more ine¢ cient than monogamous ones. The approach developed by Chiappori and his
10This is in fact the denition of a farm household employed in many surveys. For example, the following de-
nition was employed by the survey we use for Burkina Faso : "rst, that members of a household work jointly on
at least one common eld under the management of a single decision-maker, and second that members draw an
important share of their staple food stu¤s from one or more granaries which are under the control of that same
decision-maker." (see Matlon, 1988, page. 4)
11See for example Riss (1989), Abbas (1997), Kevane and L.C. (1999), Gafsi (1987), Traoré and Fourgeau
(2006).
12As mentioned previously, mutual aid with domestic chores is however observed between co-wives. There exists
a rotation system between women called the "kitchen turns" (Fainzang, 1989).
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collaborators for testing the rationality of consumption and labour supply decisions is not ap-
propriate for this kind of test, since it does not allow one to assess the extent of ine¢ ciency. We
start by briey reviewing the implications of e¢ ciency derived by Udry (1996).
Consider a household composed of I individuals engaged in the cultivation of C commodities
on plots they control, assuming this is predetermined. The plots cultivated with crop c are in-
dexed by pc, with pc = 1c; :::; Pc. Apc represents the size of the area of plot p planted with crop c
and zpc is a vector of the other characteristics of the plot. The household production of crop c is
given by:
Yc 
PPc
pc=1
eYc(L1pc ; :::; LIpc ; Lnpc ; Fpc ;Apc ; zpc); (1)
where Lipc is the labour of individual i devoted to the production of crop c on plot pc, L
n
pc is non-
family labour employed and Fpc is the amount of fertilizer used.
13 The production function eYc(:)
implicitly allows a gender-based division of work. Furthermore, the technology is permitted to
vary across crops, but not within a crop. More specically, it implies that the same production
technology is available to cultivate crop c on the di¤erent plots. The total amount of labour de-
voted to the culture of crop c by individual i and non-family members is denoted by Lic 
PPc
pc=1
Lipc
and Lnc 
PPc
pc=1
Lnpc . Similarly, the total amount of fertilizer used for crop c is designated by
Fc 
PPc
pc=1
Fpc .
Productive e¢ ciency requires that the inputs devoted to the production of a crop be allocated
across the plots planted with the crop in a way that maximizes the total production of the crop.14
Formally, given the plots that were chosen for planting crop c, the total amount of work provided
to the production of crop c, that is (L1c ; :::; LIc ; Lnc ), and the total amount of fertilizer used for
that crop F c , then fL11c ; :::; L1Pc ; :::; LI1c ; :::; LIPc ; Ln1c ; :::; LnPc ; F 1c ; :::; F Pcg is e¢ cient only if it is a
solution to the following maximization problem:
13To be more comprehensive, the list of variable inputs should also include water, pesticides and seeds; while
land and farm equipment should be treated as xed inputs.
14Unless household production decisions are separable from household consumption decisions, productive e¢ -
ciency is a necessary condition for overall e¢ ciency.
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Max
PPc
pc=1
eYc(L1pc ; :::; LIpc ; Lnpc ; Fpc ;Apc ; zpc); (P)
subject to Lic =
PPc
pc=1
Lipc i = 1; :::; I
Lnc =
PPc
pc=1
Lnpc
F c =
PPc
pc=1
Fpc ;
Lipc  0; Lnpc  0; Fpc  0;
where we assume that eYc(:) is concave, increasing with (L1pc ; :::; LIpc ; Lnpc ), increasing with Fpc up
to some point, than decreasing afterwards and nally strictly increasing in Apc . Clearly, for a
solution of program (P) to occur, inputs must be allocated across the plots in order to equal-
ize their marginal products. This applies to the C crops. Since technology is assumed to be the
same, two plots sharing the same characteristics, for example A1c = A2c and z1c = z2c , will
get the same level of inputs and therefore will produce the same level of output. This implies
that variations in inputs and output across plots planted with the same crop c are fully caused
by variations in the plotscharacteristics. This result forms the basis of Udrys test of e¢ ciency.
Formally, it can be stated as follows:
Proposition 1 If the same production function is used for a given crop, and if eYc(:) is concave,
increasing with (L1pc ; :::; L
I
pc ; L
n
pc ), increasing with Fpc up to some point, than decreasing after-
wards and nally strictly increasing in Apc, then the program (P) implies that within a household,
deviations in output and inputs across plots planted with the same crop are entirely explained by
deviations in the plotscharacteristics A and z, that is:
lipc   l
i
pc = glic
 
Apc  Ac; zpc   zc
 8 i = 1; :::I; (2)
lnpc   l
n
pc = glnc
 
Apc  Ac; zpc   zc

(3)
fpc   fpc = gfc
 
Apc  Ac; zpc   zc

(4)
ypc   ypc = gyc
 
Apc  Ac; zpc   zc

(5)
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8 pc = 1c; :::; Pc, where lipc  Lipc=Apc represents the intensity of the labour input of individual
i on plot pc with l
i
pc denoting its mean value over plots cultivated with crop c, and so on for the
other inputs. Similarly, ypc  Ypc=Apc denotes the yield of plot pc and ypc corresponds to its av-
erage value over plots planted with crop c, and nally Ac is the mean size of the plots cultivated
with crop c and zc is a vector of the means of the other characteristics of these same plots.
The proposition implies that di¤erences in the sex of the person responsible for the plot, or any
other characteristics of the person, should not cause di¤erences in input intensity or yield of plots
cultivated with the same crop.15 Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5) are necessary conditions for e¢ -
ciency and hold for every crop c, every household and at every period. Therefore, if the restric-
tion is rejected, e¢ ciency is rejected. Ine¢ ciency could be observed if social norms regulated the
allocation of labour and fertilizer or the use of agricultural equipment across plots under the re-
sponsibility of di¤erent members, for example, by giving priority to family plots as was reported
in the previous section. E¢ ciency could also be violated if the quality of the labour of the mem-
bers is higher when they work on the plots they are responsible for.16 Under these circumstances,
the household level of production will not be at its maximum.
If e¢ ciency is rejected, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of variables that should not have an im-
pact on input intensity and yield deviations under e¢ ciency, such as the gender of the person
responsible for the plot, provides an appraisal of the extent of production ine¢ ciency.17 This
assessment of productive ine¢ ciency can then be compared for monogamous and polygamous
households to determine which of the two mono-poly statuses experiences more ine¢ ciency.
15Key to this result is the assumption that the same technology is used on the di¤erent plots. Since di¤erent
household members are responsible for the household plots and because women are less likely to receive training
in agriculture than men (Saito, 1994; FAO, 2011b), this may seem questionable. However, the assumption is still
reasonable if information and skills are shared within a household. Alternatively, we can go further back in the
family decision process to consider the distribution of the plots among household members. If some members have
a higher technical knowledge for the cultivation of the crop, then maximization requires that they be the ones re-
sponsible for growing the crop.
16This could happen if the distribution of consumption between the members depends on the distribution of
the production over the plots controlled by the di¤erent members. The literature reviewed in the previous section
cleary suggests this possibility. Duo and Udry (2003) also make this point. This, combined with a sexual division
of work, could create ine¢ ciencies.
17To rene the assessment of ine¢ ciency, the loss of output due to the misallocation of input could be evaluated
by estimating a production function. Only the rst approach is used in this paper however.
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4 Data
To test Proposition 1, we use di¤erent surveys carried out in three West African countries that
experience a high prevalence of polygyny, especially in rural areas : Benin, Burkina Faso and
Senegal. The surveys are the only ones we could nd that, at the same time, provide detailed
information at the plot level and whose samples contain a su¢ cient number of polygynous house-
holds to carry out the analysis.
The Benin data are drawn from the Benin Small Farmer Survey conducted by IFPRI and LARES18
between August and November 1998. The objectives of the survey were to provide information
on rural livelihoods and on how conditions for farmers had changed over time. The survey col-
lected information on a range of subjects including inputs used in agricultural production, out-
put, the attributes of the land cultivated, such as its size, its main source of water, its distance
from the village and the type of land tenure for the main season of 1997 and the small season
of 1997-1998. The sampling design was a two-stage stratied random sample. In the rst stage,
a certain number of villages were randomly selected in each of the six departments forming the
country, for a total of 100 villages. The number of villages selected was proportional to the rel-
ative contribution of the department to the agricultural production of the country, subject to a
minimum of 10 villages per department. In each village, nine households were randomly selected
giving a nal sample size of 899 agricultural households. Among them, 499 are monogamous and
307 are polygynous, with an average of 2.4 wives for polygamous man as can be seen in Table 2.
Our sample only retained the 806 married households.
A total of 2 073 and 1 361 plots were farmed respectively by monogamous and polygynous house-
holds over the period. More than one crop per plot was cultivated in many cases, leading to 3
354 and 2 174 crop-plot observations for the monogamous and polygynous households. The great
majority of these crop-plots, that is 95%, was under the responsibility of men. In fact, only 108
married households comprise both female and male cultivators, that is 13% of the households of
our sample, 61 monogamous households and 47 polygamous ones. For the monogamous house-
18Laboratoire danalyse régionale et dexpertise sociale in Cotonou, Republic of Benin.
11
holds, a total of 150 crop-plots controlled by members of the same household with di¤erent gen-
ders were planted with the same crop. The gure rises to 226 for polygamous households.
The dataset for Burkina Faso is the same as that used by Udry (1996) and Akresh et al. (2012a,b).
It comes from a 5-year panel survey called the Burkina Faso Farm Level Studies and carried out
by ICRISAT between 1981-1985. The survey was conducted on 150 households dispersed across
three agro-climatic zones (Boromo, Djibo and Yako) and six villages. To distinguish our analy-
sis from that of Akresh, Chen and Moore, we retained, like Udry (1996), only the rst 3 years
(1981-1983),19 which is when very detailed agronomic information were collected for each plot
cultivated by the households. The information collected ranged from farming operations, inputs
and outputs, to the characteristics of the plot cultivated, such as its size, soil type, distance from
the village center and its toposequence.20 The sample of cultivated plots that were surveyed for
the years 1981-1983 included all plots for which the principal crop was a cereal, cotton or a root
crop. For plots on which the principal crop was a vegetable or other minor crop, only one plot
under the responsibility of the household head and one plot of the senior wife were included.
Among the households for which the marital status is known, approximately 51% of the house-
holds were polygamous and the average number of wives per polygamous man was 2.5 over the
three years observed (see Table 2).
A total of 1 517 and 2 440 plots were farmed respectively by monogamous and polygynous house-
holds over the period of 1981-1983. More than one crop was often cultivated per plot. Informa-
tion on the output of the rst three main crops of the plot was collected, but since the area de-
voted to these di¤erent crops within the plot was not recorded, yield at the crop-plot level is not
available as is the case for Benin. More women do individual cultivation as compared to Benin,
with 35% of the plots being controlled by them. For the monogamous households, over the three
years, a total of 318 plots controlled by members with di¤erent genders were planted with the
same primary crop, in the same year. On the side of polygynous households, 1052 plots con-
trolled by members of diverging genders were planted with the same primary crop, in the same
19Akresh et al. (2012b) uses the ve years, while uses only the years 1984-1985 Akresh et al. (2012a) .
20For more details on the survey, see Matlon (1988) and Udry (1996).
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year.
The Senegal database comes from a survey called the IFPRI/ISRA Study of Consumption and
Supply Impacts of Agricultural Price Policies in the Peanut Basin and Senegal Oriental. As its
name suggests, the aim of the survey was to better understand the behavior of rural and urban
households in terms of consumption and supply of agricultural products. The sample consisted
of twelve representative zones of the Peanut Basin and of the Senegal Oriental, ten of which were
rural and two urban. In each of the rural areas, three typical villages were selected and for each
of them, twelve households were randomly selected. Each plot cultivated by the rural households
of the sample were surveyed and some land characteristics were enumerated, such as the size of
the plot cultivated and its tenure. Information on the input and output of its main three crops
were recorded over two harvest years, 1989 and 1990. The agricultural data for four of the rural
areas are not available however. For three of these areas, the reason is that the data was not cap-
tured due to time constraints. In the latter case, the data was discarded due to poor quality.
The size of the sample available for this study amounts to 195 households. Among the married
households, 41% are polygamous and the average number of wives per polygamous household
is 2.3 (see Table 2). A total of 633 and 573 plots were farmed by monogamous and polygynous
households respectively. In a few cases, more than one crop was cultivated on the plot, which
leads to 676 crop-plot observations for the monogamous households and 602 crop-plot observa-
tions for the polygamous households. Eighty percent of the plots cultivated were controlled by
men. For monogamous households, a total of 237 plots controlled by members of di¤erent gen-
ders from the same households were planted with the same crop, the same year. The correspond-
ing gure for polygamous households is 338.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the yields and the areas of plots controlled by men and
women for the three countries disaggregated by the mono/poly status. For Benin and Senegal,
the yield is dened as the harvest market value of the crop grown on the plot divided by the
area of land devoted to this variety. Because the plot area for each of the three major crops is
not known for Burkina Faso, the yield is dened instead as the harvest market value of the three
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main crops grown on the plot divided by the area of the plot. For monogamous households, the
average yield of male plots is signicantly higher than those of females in Benin, but is lower in
Burkina, although not signicantly. In Senegal, there is no noticeable di¤erence. The picture is
similar for polygamous households, but the female-male di¤erential is more pronounced and now
signicant for Burkina Faso. For each type of marriage in each country, men cultivate plots that
are signicantly larger than the ones cultivated by women. The di¤erence is particularly pro-
nounced in Burkina Faso, where men can cultivate plots that are 10 times larger than those of
women.
Now comparing monogamous with polygamous households, we see that the yield of all plots be-
longing to monogamous households is signicantly lower than those of polygamous households in
Burkina and Senegal. In both countries, the yields of male and female cultivators from monog-
amous households is lower than those of male and female cultivators belonging to polygamous
households, although not always signicantly according to the 5% level . Furthermore, we see
that the mono-poly di¤erential is higher for female plots than male plots in Burkina Faso, while
it is the reverse for Senegal. In Benin, there is no signicant di¤erence between the yield of monog-
amous and polygamous households. Monogamous male cultivators in Benin have yields below
their polygamous counterpart, while monogamous female cultivators achieve higher yields than
polygamous female cultivators, although none of the gaps are signicant. Finally, we note that
male and female cultivators from polygamous households tend to grow plots that are signicantly
larger than those of monogamous male and female cultivators, with the exception of Burkinabe
males, where the mono-poly di¤erential is not nearly signicant.
This rst snapshot on female-male di¤erential and mono-poly di¤erential allows us to discern a
few patterns. Men cultivate larger plots in all the settings. Polygamous cultivators, whether male
or female, also tend to grow bigger plots. Moreover, polygamous households appear to achieve
yields that are at least as good as those of monogamous households. Finally, the average female-
male di¤erential, whether positive or negative, is higher everywhere for polygamous households.
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5 Estimating the e¤ect of polygyny on agricultural e¢ ciency
The female-male di¤erential observed for Benin and Burkina may not be the result of an ine¢ -
cient allocation of inputs. Furthermore the greater female-male di¤erential observed for polyga-
mous households does not necessarily originate from polygyny itself. This section discusses our
strategy for estimating the causal e¤ect of polygyny on the intrahousehold e¢ ciency of agricul-
tural decisions.
As seen previously, household production e¢ ciency implies that within a household, variations in
yields across plots planted with the same crop are entirely explained by variations in the plots
characteristics. Other exogenous variables have no inuence. The female-male comparisons of
Table 3 are neither based on variations within households, nor within crops. To ensure that we
compare the yields of men and women sharing the same household and cultivating the same crop
the same year, we use a household-year-crop xed e¤ect approach. This may not be su¢ cient
however, since the distribution of plots between the male and the female cultivators of a house-
hold is endogenous. Recall that women were reported to receive the plots of lowest quality in the
previous section. The e¤ect of a di¤erential between the intrinsic characteristics of the male and
female plots will be confounded with the e¤ect of an ine¢ cient allocation of inputs across male
and female plots. Our main approach to identify the e¤ect of an ine¢ cient allocation of inputs
across male and female plots is to control for all the observed intrinsic characteristics of the plots.
The richness of information available varies with the database. It includes for Benin, the area
decile, the land tenure, the distance to the compound, and the source of water.21 For Burkina
Faso, it comprises the area decile, the toposequence, the soil type, and the location of the plot.
For Senegal, we only have information on the area decile.
Since we cannot be sure of properly controlling for all the relevant plot characteristics, especially
for Benin and Senegal since we have fewer controls, we use a second approach. For Benin, we are
able to exploit the fact that a plot is a subdivision of a eld. To be more precise, household elds
are the basic units in the survey and are frequently subdivided into plots that are not always un-
21The possibilities are : rain water, irrigation and lowland. Rain water is the excluded category.
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der the responsibility of the same household members. If unobserved di¤erences in intrinsic char-
acteristics are more likely to vary across plots belonging to the di¤erent elds than across plots
belonging to same eld, then a eld xed e¤ect should help remove the unobserved heterogeneity
in the physical characteristics of the plots. We also know to which eld plots belong to in Sene-
gal, but unfortunately all the plots of a eld are always under the responsibility of a person of
the same sex.22
The basic equation to be estimated is thus specied as follows:
ypcht = Fpcht + (FpchtPht) + zpcht+ cht + pcht (6)
where ypcht is the yield of plot p planted mainly with crop c and under the control of household
h at time t, Fpcht is equal to 1 if the person responsible for the plot is a woman, Pht is equal to
1 if the household is polygamous, zpcht is a vector of intrinsic characteristics of the plot, cht is
a household-year-crop xed e¤ect and pcht is an error term. The error term summarizes the in-
uence of unobserved variables and is potentially heteroskedastic. The equation (6) is estimated
separately for each country. Note that it is not possible to include the binary variable Pht since it
does not vary across plots cultivated by the same household.
The parameter  does not represent intrahousehold ine¢ ciency in itself, since it can occur along
other lines than the sex of the cultivators, such their status within the household, their agricul-
tural knowledge or intrinsic productivity. To be more precise,  represents only the intrahouse-
hold female-male ine¢ ciency. The null hypothesis that monogamous households are e¢ cient cor-
responds to  = 0. The null hypothesis that polygamous households are e¢ cient is in turn that
( + ) = 0. There are three possible scenarios about the e¤ect of polygyny on e¢ ciency. The
rst is that polygyny is conducive to e¢ ciency as is argued by Akresh et al. (2012a,b). We would
then observe that polygamous households are less ine¢ cient, that is to say that j + j < jj.
The second scenario is that polygyny is neutral. This corresponds to a situation where monoga-
22Note that it is not possible to use the time dimension to control for the e¤ect of unobserved plot characteris-
tics since plots are redrawn each year.
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mous and polygamous households are either both e¢ cient or both ine¢ cient to the same extent.
This would mean that  = 0. And nally, polygyny is conducive to ine¢ ciency, leading to the
situation where monogamous households are less ine¢ cient, that is j + j > jj.
Polygyny is however endogenous.23 In section 2, it was ascribe to the system of land rights in
place and to the productivity of women in agriculture (Boserup, 1970), which was itself related to
cropping patterns and the technology available (Jacoby, 1995). While these studies on polygyny
are based on variations in the incidence of polygyny across regions, some of the links revealed
may also be operational within a region. Men who have access to more productive technology
could be less inclined to opt for polygyny. It is also possible that polygamous men choose wives
that are known to be particularly productive in agriculture. Since the characteristics that have
an e¤ect on the desired number of wives could also have an e¤ect on intrahousehold e¢ ciency, a
simple comparison of intrahousehold ine¢ ciency between monogamous and polygamous house-
holds could be marred by a selection bias. For example, a household head with better access
to productive technology could be less inclined to become polygamist, and at the same time be
more able to allocate inputs more e¢ ciently across his plots and his wifes plots. The household-
year-crop xed e¤ect cht takes care of such situations since it eliminates the e¤ect of all unob-
served household characteristics, that is characteristics that are constant for all the cultivators of
the household.
The household-year-crop xed e¤ect will not, however, capture intrahousehold di¤erentials be-
tween male and female cultivators, which poses a threat to the identication of  if this di¤eren-
tial varies between monogamous and polygamous households. Let us imagine for example, that
men with low intrinsic productivity are more susceptible to choosing a more able wife and also
less susceptible to taking a second wife. If the intrahousehold di¤erential of intrinsic productiv-
ity between men and women has an e¤ect on intrahousehold ine¢ ciency, then the causal e¤ect
of polygyny on female-male intrahousehold ine¢ ciency will not be identied. There is also the
23Polygyny may be considered exogenous when the reason is the infertility of the rst wife or when levirate
norms have forced the brother of a deceased man to marry his widow. This would provide a natural experiment,
but this information is rarely available.
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possibility that greater intrahousehold e¢ ciency makes households richer, which may, in turn, in-
crease the probability that household heads choose to take on a second wife. To deal with these
last two possibilities, our main strategy is to use an instrumental variable estimation. We need
variables that are correlated with the marital status, but that are not correlated with the di¤er-
ential in female-male characteristics that might be causing the di¤erential in female-male yield.
Ethnicity is a plausible candidate since the prevalence of polygyny is well known to vary widely
across ethnic groups.24 Furthermore, it seems very unlikely that gender di¤erences in the char-
acteristics in question vary from one ethnic group to another. We mentioned in Section 2 that
the system of land rights varies from one ethnic group to another, and raised the possibility that
it might partially explain the variance in the prevalence of polygamy among ethnic groups. It
is also likely that ethnicity, through its system of land rights, inuences the average yield of the
plots by ethnic groups (Goldstein and Udry, 2008), but what really matters here, is that gender
di¤erences in unobserved plot characteristics is not correlated with ethnicity, conditional on a
village-year-crop xed e¤ect. This our key identifying assumption. We can no longer have a xed
e¤ect at the household level in order to properly instrument the mono/poly status. However, to
take into account geographical variations, we use a xed e¤ect at the village level.
Since we cannot have a xed e¤ect at the household level in order to properly instrument polyg-
yny, the female-male di¤erentials is no longer based on within household variations. This might
be particularly problematic for Benin and Senegal, where a small fraction of households include
female cultivators. Households with female cultivators might be di¤erent from households with-
out female cultivators. One way to eliminate this kind of selection bias is to base the estimation
of the female-male di¤erential on households whose mono/poly status change over the periods
observed. We implement this approach with the Burkina Faso and Senegal datasets since there
are few households that change from monogamy to polygyny or vice versa.
24This is clearly the case in the three samples we use.
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6 Empirical results
Starting with Benin, the rst column of Table 4 shows that the yield of womens plots is 40 fCFA
lower than that of mens plots, when a household-year-crop xed e¤ect estimation is used along
with controls on plots characteristics. This is less than what was suggested by Table 3.25 Plots
smaller than the median category are signicantly associated with higher yields. Surprisingly,
irrigated plots achieve lower yields than those whose main source of water is rain, which may in-
dicate that plots with soils holding less water are selected for irrigation. To investigate the pos-
sibility that the e¤ect of an ine¢ cient allocation of inputs is confused with a di¤erential in un-
observed intrinsic characteristics between male and female plots, we build on the fact that plots
are grouped together in what is called a eld. If plots belonging to the same eld share more in-
trinsic physical characteristics than plots belonging to di¤erent elds, because they are closer for
example, and if plots belonging to a same eld are allocated to household members of a di¤erent
sex, then adding a xed e¤ect at the eld level should help identify the causal e¤ect of the sex
of the cultivator. Unfortunately, a very small fraction of elds is composed of both female and
male plots. More specically, there are 57 elds providing variation in the sex of the person re-
sponsible for its plots, and these elds belong to 35 households, which represents 33% of the mar-
ried households in the sample comprising both male and female cultivators.26 The second column
of Table 4 presents the results of the estimation with the household-year-crop-eld xed e¤ect.
The e¤ect of the being a female cultivator drops by a third with this specication and stops be-
ing signicant. This evidence is consistent with the literature mentioned earlier reporting that
plots allocated to women are of lower quality.
The third column keeps the household-year-crop-eld xed e¤ect, but adds an interaction term
25Note further that when a household xed e¤ect specication is used without any controls on plots character-
istics, the female-male di¤erential in Table 3 completely disappears. This result is reported in the rst line of the
Table 8 in the Appendix. This suggests that there are important di¤erences between households with female cul-
tivators and those without. When controls on plots characteristics are included in the household xed e¤ect spec-
ication, the female-male di¤erential increases dramatically to -82. Since smaller plots are associated with higher
yields, this shows that within households, women tend to cultivate smaller plots than men. If a crop xed e¤ect is
added to the household xed e¤ect, the female-male di¤erential drops by half to -40, indicating that women tend to
cultivate crops that have lower yields. See Table 8.
26Their number is 108. See section 4 on the data.
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between the sex of the cultivator and the marital status of the household. The yield of plots un-
der the responsibility of a woman are found to be 63 fCFA lower than those of men in monog-
amous households, while they are 9 fCFA higher in polygynous households as reported on the
Fem+Fem*Poly line at the bottom of the Table. The negative impact of being a female culti-
vator in monogamous households is signicant, but the positive impact of being a female culti-
vator in polygamous households is not at all signicant. The interaction term itself is positive
and signicant at the 10% level. This evidence is coherent with the thesis advanced by Akresh
et al. (2012a,b). Since the identication of the e¤ect of gender and of the e¤ect of polygyny on
the e¤ect of gender is based on a small number of households, we also provide the results of an
estimation dropping the eld xed e¤ect in column 4. The results are indeed quite di¤erent. The
female-male di¤erential is now lower in monogamous households (-29 compared to -64) and no
longer signicant, while it is higher (in absolute value terms) in polygamous households (-48 com-
pared to 9) and signicant at the 10% level. This may indicate that there is a female-male di¤er-
ential in unobserved plotscharacteristics that is to the advantage of female cultivators in monog-
amous households, but to their disadvantage in polygamous households.
Since polygyny is endogenous, it is indeed possible that the estimated di¤erence between monog-
amous and polygamous households in terms of the female-male di¤erential may be caused by un-
observed di¤erences between male and female cultivators that are specic to the marital status.
As mentioned in the previous section, it may be that less productive men try to compensate by
choosing more productive wives and by marrying fewer women. If the intrahousehold di¤eren-
tial of intrinsic productivity between men and women has an e¤ect on intrahousehold ine¢ ciency,
then the causal e¤ect of polygyny on intrahousehold female-male ine¢ ciency will not be identi-
ed. It is also possible that greater intrahousehold e¢ ciency makes household heads wealthier,
which may in turn increase the probability that he will be able to pay the brideprice of an ad-
ditional wife. To deal with this possibility, we use an instrumental variable strategy. We rely on
the variation in the prevalence of polygyny across ethnic groups and on the fact that ethnicity is
exogenous.
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The fth column reports the rst stage regression for the interaction term on gender and polyg-
yny, Fem*Poly, with a village-year-crop xed e¤ect specication and three excluded instruments:
two dummy variables and the interaction of one of the dummies with the gender of the cultiva-
tor. The two dummies respectively concern the Adja and Nago ethnic groups, which account for
9% and 8% of the households in the sample, making them the third and fourth most important
ethnic groups. Only the Fon and the Bariba are more populous, respectively representing 20%
and 15% of the households in the sample. Among all the ethnic groups, the Adja are those that
experience the highest rate of polygyny. The third excluded instrument is therefore an interac-
tion term between the Adja ethnic group and the sex of the cultivator. Two of the excluded in-
struments are individually highly signicant. Moreover, the three instruments are overidentifying.
Since we are only interested in the Fem*Poly endogenous variable - the endogenous variable Poly
being more a kind of control - we report the Angrist-Pischke rst-stage F statistics instead of the
Cragg-Donald statistics. The Angrist-Pischke rst-stage F statistics for the three instruments is
118, allowing us to reject the possibility that they are weak instruments for Fem*Poly. For space
reasons, the results of the rst stage regression for the variable Poly are presented in Table 7 in
the Appendix along with other test statistics. The last column of Table 4 shows a female-male
yield di¤erential similar to the one estimated with the third specication, but a negative e¤ect
for polygyny, although none of the coe¢ cients are signicant. The e¤ect of polygyny itself on
yield is also insignicant. One should note that this female-male di¤erential is not based anymore
on within household variations, which could pose a problem and may explain why signicance is
gone.27 This rst piece of evidence based on Benin is thus not really conclusive.
We now turn to the results obtained for Burkinabe households for the years 1981-1983. The rst
column of Table 5 presents the results of an estimation using the same specication as Udry
(1996),28 with the same sample, the only di¤erence being that it is limited here to married house-
holds. We see that the plots of women have a yield 31 fCFA lower than those of men, when a
household-year-crop xed e¤ect specication is used with controls on plot characteristics. Given
27Especially, given that it was reported in footnote 28 that the female-male di¤erential based on within houshe-
old variation is much di¤erent from the one that is not restricted to that variation.
28See column 1 of his Table 3.
21
that the average yield is around 82 fCFA, this di¤erential is more important in relative terms
than that observed for the Benin households. Moreover, it is in the opposite direction from that
of the female-male yield di¤erential presented in Table 3.29 As is the case with Benin, plots smaller
than the median category are signicantly associated with higher yields, while plots larger than
the median are signicantly associated with lower yields. The other controls on plot characteris-
tics are generally not signicant.30
The introduction of the interaction term between sex and polygyny does not alter the e¤ect of
the genders cultivator on yield. The coe¢ cient is maintained around -31 fCFA and stays sig-
nicant. The interaction term is not nearly signicant. Therefore, e¢ ciency is rejected for both
monogamous and polygamous households, and the assumption that polygamous households are
equally ine¢ cient can not be rejected. This does not mean however, that the marital status is
without an e¤ect on the intrahousehold e¢ ciency. It could be that polygyny decreases e¢ ciency,
but that more e¢ cient households are more susceptible to becoming polygamous for example, the
two e¤ects cancelling each other out. One way to eliminate this selection bias is to exploit the in-
formation provided by households whose marital status changes over time. This allow us to com-
pare the same households before and after the change in the marital status. They are, however,
only 9 households to change from monogamy to polygyny or vice versa, during the three years
observed. To capture the variation in the mono/poly status through the years, we remove the
time dimension of the household xed-e¤ect. More specically, we used a household xed-e¤ect
estimation and a separate village-year-crop xed e¤ect. The results are reported in the third col-
umn of Table 5. Polygyny is found to adversely a¤ect yields, at least in the short term. In addi-
tion, its harmful e¤ect seems to be felt as much on male plots as on female plots, since the inter-
29 In fact, the positive gap of 18 fCFA presented in Table 3 does not change much when a household xed ef-
fect specication is used without any controls on plot characteristics See Table 9 in the Appendix. When controls
on plot characteristics are included in a household xed-e¤ect specication, the female-male yield di¤erential is
completely reversed and almost twice as big in absolute value terms. As with Benin this is due to the fact that
woman tend to cultivate smaller plots, which are associated with higher yields. The much more pronounced e¤ect
obtained, compared to the Benin results, is coherent with the fact, reported earlier, that the di¤erence between the
area of male and female plots is much more pronounced in Burkina Faso. Finally, once a crop xed-e¤ect is added
to the household xed e¤ect, the female-male yield di¤erential drops slightly, indicating that women tend to culti-
vated crops that have lower yields than men, but not to the extent found for Benin. See Table 9.
30Furthermore, we could not reject the hypothesis that their joint e¤ect on yield is di¤erent from zero.
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action term is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Based on these results, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that polygyny has no e¤ect on female-male intrahousehold ine¢ ciency.
Since the identication is based on a very small sample of households, we also perform an IV es-
timation as was done for Benin. The variables used to instrument the variables Poly and Fem*Poly
are again two dummy variables on ethnicity and an interaction term between one of the dummy
variables and the gender of the operator. The dummies are for the Rimaibe and the Mossi eth-
nic groups, accounting for 19% and 38%, respectively, of the households in the sample. Polygyny
is widespread in all the ethnic groups in the sample, except with the Rimaibe where it is virtu-
ally absent. The interaction term is therefore between this ethnic group and the gender of the
cultivator. Column 4 of Table 5 presents the rst-stage regression of the variable Fem*Poly. The
three excluded instruments are individually signicant and jointly overidentifying. Based on the
Angrist-Pischke rst-stage F statistics, we strongly reject that they are weak. See Table 7 in the
Appendix for the results of the rst-stage regression of Poly. The last column provides the re-
sults of the IV estimation. With this specication, the yields di¤erential between male and fe-
male plots in monogamous households is twice as high as in the other columns. Furthermore,
polygyny appears to almost eliminate that di¤erential. Since polygyny does not have a signif-
icant e¤ect on yields, the elimination of the gap between the performance of male and female
plots appears to take the form of both an increase in the performance of female plots and a de-
crease of the performance of male plots. These last results support the possibility put forward by
Akresh et al. (2012a,b), but are in contradiction with the results of column 3. One possible ex-
planation would be that polygyny does not change intrahousehold e¢ ciency in the short-term,
but improves it in the longer term. Both specications nevertheless have their drawbacks. The
identication in column 3 is based on a very small number of households whose marital status
changes over time, while the identication in column 5 is not based on within household varia-
tions.31
The last set of results concerns Senegal and is presented in Table 6. This dataset is not as rich as
31Note, as was reported in footnote 32, that the female-male di¤erential based on within household variation is
not much di¤erent from the one that is not restricted to that variation. So it may not be a problem here.
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the previous ones, so we have fewer control variables. When only the size of the plot is taken into
account, the yield of female cultivators is 34 fCFA lower than that of male cultivators based on a
household-year-crop xed e¤ect. This di¤erential represents 64% of the average yield (53 fCFA),
making it the most dramatic gap of the three countries studied in this paper. It could be due to
the fact that we have fewer controls.32 This picture is very di¤erent from that of Table 3, where
there is no noticeable di¤erence between male and female plots.33 The pattern observed between
the size of the plot and yield is again observed for Senegal. The inclusion of the interaction term
between gender and polygyny does not change the coe¢ cient of gender. The interaction term it-
self is zero. Therefore, the e¢ ciency of agricultural production is thus rejected for both statuses
and we can not reject the assumption that polygamous households are as ine¢ cient as monoga-
mous households. The third column tries to isolate the e¤ect of polygyny on intrahousehold ef-
ciency. As is the case for Burkina Faso, the identication is based on households whose marital
status changes between the two years observed. However, since there are only 2 households in
this situation, we instead exploit the change in the number of wives, assuming that the relation-
ship between the number of wives and intrahousehold ine¢ ciency is monotonic. There are three
households whose number of wives increases from 2 to 3 and a fourth household whose number
of wives changes from 3 to 4. We thus have six households in total that experience a change in
their number of wives. We remove the time dimension of the household xed e¤ect in order to
capture the variation in the number of wives during the two years. The results of the household
xed-e¤ect estimation with a separate village-year-crop xed e¤ect are reported in the third col-
umn of Table 6. The e¤ect of the number of wives on yields and on the e¤ect of gender on yields
is found to be insignicant, based on the experience of these households.
32This is not so clear however, since for Burkina Faso, controlling for land characteristics other than size does
not change the female-male di¤erential. Furthermore, the hypothesis that these controls are not jointly signicant
was not rejected.
33Like for Burkina Faso, restricting the estimation of the male-female di¤erential to within household variations,
does not produce much change. The di¤erential remains quasi-absent as on can see in Table 10. This suggests that
households with female cultivators are not di¤erent, along this dimension, from households without. When controls
on plot characteristics are included in a household xed-e¤ect specication, the male-female di¤erential increases
to -16 and becomes signicant. Again, this comes from the fact that women tend to cultivate smaller plots than
men. The change is not as dramatic as for Benin and Senegal. Surprisingly, when a crop xed e¤ect is added to
the household xed e¤ect, the female-male di¤erential doubles, which suggests that women tend to cultivated crops
that have higher yields than men. See Table 10 in the Appendix.
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As for Burkina, since the identication is based on a very small number of households, we pursue
the analysis with an IV approach. Our excluded instruments are two dummies for the Wolof and
Diakhanke ethnic groups and an interaction term between the gender of the plot operator and
the Wolof ethnicity. Respectively, 44% and 7% of the households in the sample belong to these
ethnic groups. The prevalence of polygyny is 55% among the Wolof, the highest among the ma-
jor ethnic groups listed in the sample. Two of the excluded instruments are individually signi-
cant at the 5% level and the third at the 10% level in the rst-stage regression of Fem*Poly. The
Angrist-Pischke F statistic is high enough to reject the hypothesis that the instruments are weak
and the Hansen statistic allows us to reject the hypothesis that the residuals are correlated with
the excluded instruments. See Table 7 in the Appendix for the results of the rst-stage regression
of Poly. Based on the results of the IV estimation, polygyny causes a yield improvement. It ap-
pears however, at the same time, to increase the di¤erential between male and female plots, with
a 10% level of condence, as though only plots under the responsibility of men beneted from
polygyny.34 Furthermore, with this specication, e¢ ciency is not rejected for monogamous house-
holds, only for polygamous ones. This evidence is in conict with the theory proposed by Akresh
et al. (2012a,b).
The evidence presented for the three countries on the causal e¤ect of polygyny is mixed. The
IV results for Benin do not allow us to reject the assumption that polygyny has no e¤ect on in-
trahousehold e¢ ciency. Our condence in the identication of the causal e¤ect is not too high
however. In Burkina Faso, the causal e¤ect is estimated with two di¤erent approaches. When the
identication is based on a small number of households experiencing a change in their mono/poly
status, we nd that polygyny has no e¤ect on intrahousehold e¢ ciency. When the identica-
tion instead relies on an instrumental approach, we nd that polygyny improves intrahousehold
e¢ ciency. For Senegal, like for Burkina Faso, we do not reject that polygyny has no e¤ect on
intrahousehold e¢ ciency when we rely on the experience of households whose number of wives
changes between the two periods observed. But, as opposed to Burkina, the IV results show that
34This male-female di¤erential is not based on within household variations, but, as was reported in footnote 33,
since the di¤erential based on within household variation and the one that is not are very similar, this might not
be an issue.
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polygamy deteriorates intrahousehold e¢ ciency.
The diverging results provided by the two identication strategies could be reconciled if the ef-
fects of polygyny on the intrahousehold e¢ ciency are only felt after some time. Even in this case,
the e¤ect of polygamy in the medium and long terms would still be di¤erent in Burkina Faso and
Senegal. This is not impossible however since the e¤ect of polygamy could be culturally specic.
The theory put forward by Akresh et al. (2012a,b) may therefore be valid only in some contexts.
7 Conclusion
Polygyny is a highly debated subject. For some, it is a practice with deep roots in African his-
tory which has allowed women to marry in periods of decit in the number of men due to higher
male mortality. For others, it is a form of discrimination towards women that has negative con-
sequences on the life of women married to polygamous men. Many anthropologists have indeed
provided evidence that polygyny is conducive to conicting behaviors, ranging from verbal and
physical aggression to poisoning (DuBois, 1960; LeVine, 1962; Flinn and England, 1995; Jankowiak
et al., 2005; Kazianga and Klonner, 2009). Some studies also nd that polygyny has adverse im-
pacts on the physical and mental health of wives and their children (Sellen, 1999; Arney, 2002;
Hadley, 2005; Al-Krenawi and Graham, 2006; Kazianga and Klonner, 2009).
Many countries now prohibit polygyny and those where it is still legal are under pressure to ban
it. Until now, pressure has mostly been based on the discrimination argument. However, a small
amount of recent literature linking the marriage system of a country to its level and rate of devel-
opment (Lagerlof, 2005; Tertilt, 2005, 2006; Edlund and Lagerlof, 2004; Gould et al., 2008) might
provide ammunition to those opposing polygyny in Africa. Tertilt (2005) for example shows that
polygyny crowds-out investments in physical assets and increases fertility. She nds that banning
polygyny would decrease fertility by 40%, increase saving by 70% and increase output per capita
by 170% in countries with a high incidence of polygyny. The papers by Akresh et al. (2012a,b)
point however in the other direction. They argue that polygyny may increase intrahousehold e¢ -
ciency and provide supportive evidence. They ascribe the e¢ ciency improvement to the fact that
26
altruism is lower in polygamous marriages, since wives do not generally care for each other. This
lower altruism, they say, increases the incentive of spouses to cooperate by lowering the utility
they expect to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium.
The contribution of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence on whether polygyny leads
to an improvement in intrahousehold e¢ ciency. We study the intrahousehold e¢ ciency of agri-
cultural production of three countries with high levels of polygyny : Benin, Burkina Faso and
Senegal. The causal e¤ect of polygyny is tentatively estimated with two di¤erent strategies : an
approach based on the experience of households going through a change in its number of wives
and an IV approach relying on the relationship between polygyny and ethnicity. Both approaches
are used along with a xed-e¤ect approach controlling for unobserved confounders.
The evidence we obtain is mixed. For Benin, the assumption that polygyny has no e¤ect on in-
trahousehold e¢ ciency is not rejected. For Burkina Faso and Senegal, we again do not reject the
assumption that polygyny has no e¤ect on intrahousehold e¢ ciency with the rst identication
strategy. However, based on the IV approach, we reject the assumption for both countries. More-
over, we nd that polygyny improves intrahousehold e¢ ciency in Burkina, but deteriorates it in
Senegal. The diverging results provided by the two identication strategies could be reconciled if
the e¤ects of polygyny on the intrahousehold e¢ ciency are only felt in the longer term. But even
under this assumption, the longer term e¤ect of polygyny would remain di¤erent in Burkina Faso
and Senegal. We conclude that the e¤ect of polygamy could be culturally specic. Therefore,
the theory put forward by Akresh et al. (2012a,b), that polygyny may increase intrahousehold
e¢ ciency, may be valid only in some limited contexts.
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Table 1: Polygyny in West Africa
Acceptance Legality
of of % Men practicing polygynyb
Countries polygynya polygynya All area Rural area Urban area
Benin 0.5 No 29:3c 30:7c 19:6c
Burkina Faso 1 Yes 29:5d 33:6d 11:5d
Cap Verde - - - - -
Côte-dIvoire 0.5 No 16:9e 21:2e 9:5e
Gambia 1 Yes 35:1f - -
Ghana 0.5 No 18:2g 12:2g 4:1g
Guinea 1 No 36:7i 40:1i 28:9i
Guinea-Bissau 1 No - - -
Liberia 0.5 No 7:6j 9:9j 3:0j
Mali 1 Yes 27:9c 26:5c 22:1c
Mauritania 1 Yes 6:2k 4:8k 7:7k
Niger 1 - 22:0c 22:7c 18:6c
Nigeria 1 No 18:7g 19:5g 9:0g
Senegal 1 Yes 20:0i 25:3i 14:3i
Sierra Leone 1 No 20:1g 21:1g 8:5g
Togo 1 Yes 24:3e 28:1e 15:7e
a. 2009 OECD Gender Institution and Development database, 1 : accepted, 0 : not accepted,
b. DHS, except Gambia, c. 2006, d. 2003, e. 1998, f. Tertilt (2005), g. 2008, i. 2005, j. 2007, k. 2001
Table 2: Households by marital regime
Benin Burkina Faso Senegal
average average average
1997-1998 1981-1983 1989-1990
Number of households in sample 899 145 195
Unmarried or unknonw marital regime 93 24 12
Married 806 121 183
Monogamous 62% 49% 59%
Polygamous 38% 51% 41%
Number of wives 2.4 2.5 2.3
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Table 3: Yield and area by country, marital regime and gender
All Monogamous Polygamous mono - poly
households households households
Yield Yield Area Yield Area Yield Area
k fCFA k fCFA hectares k fCFA hectares (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
Benin 1997-1998
All plots 258 254 .771 266 .991 -12 -0.22
(625) (.925) (783) (1.12) (-.585) (-.742) (-.162)
Female plots 188 204 .429 176 .514 28 -.085
(218) (226) (.398) (211) (.521) (1.08) (-1.57)
Male plots 263 256 .786 273 1.03 -17 -.244
(710) (636) (.938) (813) (1.15) (-.801) (-7.85)
m - f -75 -52 -.357 -97 -.516
(t-stat.) (-4.57) (-2.23) (-3.92) (-9.07) (-10.69)
Burkina Faso 1981-1983
All plots 82.4 74.7 .515 87.2 .502 -12.5 .013
(159) (146) (1.01) (166) (.954) (-2.59) (.402)
Female plots 94.1 82 .079 100 .110 -18 -.031
(176) (140) (.163) (191) (.132) (-1.97) (-3.49)
Male plots 76.1 71.5 .703 79.3 .745 -7.80 -.042
(148) (148) (1.16) (148) (1.15) (-1.32) (-.890)
m - f 18.0 10.5 -.624 20.7 -.635
(t-stat.) (3.25) (1.34) (-16.72) (2.82) (-21.29)
Senegal 1989-1990
All plots 53.1 46.3 .766 60.7 .897 -14.4 -.131
(70.8) (55.0) (.768) (84.4) (1.05) (-3.57) (-2.52)
Female plots 54.9 47.5 .422 59.5 .492 -12.0 -.070
(63.8) (45.0) (.324) (72.7) (.355) (-1.65) (-1.63)
Male plots 52.6 46.1 .826 61.2 1.05 -15.1 -.224
(72.5) (56.6) (.806) (88.6) (1.18) (-3.11) (-3.41)
m - f 2.30 1.40 -.404 -1.70 -.558
(t-stat.) (.509) (.282) (-8.68) (-.247) (-8.90)
Standard deviations are in parentheses when not otherwise stated.
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Table 4: E¤ect of the marital regime on male-female yield di¤erential - Benin 1998
1 2 3 4 5 6
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
household-crop household-eld-crop household-eld-crop household-crop village-crop village-crop
year xed e¤ect year xed e¤ect year xed e¤ect year xed e¤ect year xed e¤ect year xed e¤ect
hline Yield Yield Yield Yield Fem*Poly Yield
Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err.
Fem -40.16** (19.38) -27.60 (25.39) -63.63** (28.97) -28.87 (19.17) .5396** (.0297) -70.55 (114.7)
Poly 61.22 (419.8)
Fem*Poly 72.70* (43.22) -19.06 (32.29) -110.9 (271.2)
Size 1 159.4** (51.00) 195.9** (98.51) 194.3** (98.52) 159.4** (50.97) -.0123* (.0074) 498.2** (66.86)
Size 2 111.1** (28.96) 308.8** (150.4) 308.3** (150.2) 111.2** (28.98) -.0001 (.0099) 29.88 (50.74)
Size 3 52.40** (12.66) 75.49** (26.67) 81.76** (26.74) 52.00** (12.58) -.0189** (.0079) 56.15** (17.93)
Size 4 37.82** (17.12) 66.12 (67.86) 64.37 (67.06) 37.52** (17.11) -.0130 (.0087) -17.90 (30.00)
Size 6 31.42 (26.04) 113.0 (118.7) 113.2 (118.2) 31.16 (26.07) -.0105 (.0100) -15.77 (72.28)
Size 7 17.73 (17.23) -19.93 (60.13) -24.40 (60.08) 18.35 (17.34) -.0001 (.0066) -27.67 (23.87)
Size 8 6.669 (15.16) 28.26 (23.34) 27.12 (22.99) 6.684 (15.16) -.0123** (.0055) -15.53 (54.01)
Size 9 4.538 (12.22) 65.18 (47.55) 58.85 (45.24) 4.624 (12.24) -.0095* (.0055) -38.63 (53.45)
Size 10 -17.26 (13.38) -20.71 (37.78) -19.55 (39.02) -16.94 (13.26) -.0088 (.0063) -45.76 (99.10)
Distance 2.703 (2.531) 426.0 (1596) 134.5 (1686) 2.675 (2.548) .0025** (.0007) 2.515 (5.034)
Distance2 -.1700 (.1143) -38.27 (152.1) -10.51 (160.7) -.1692 (.1146) - .0000 (.0000) -.0029 (.1375)
Irrigated -22.18** (7.864) -21.93** (7.929) .0113 (.0114) 294.3 (288.2)
Lowland -34.86 (49.35) -35.47 (49.33) -.0209** (.0054) 89.78 (78.46)
Adja .4672** (.0301)
Nago .0029 (.0071)
Fem*Adja -.4642** (.0300)
Fem+Fem*Poly 9.067 (35.59) -47.94* (28.41) -181.4 (218.8)
Observations 5231 5231 5231 5231 5203 5203
Angrist-Pischke F test of excluded instruments F(2,4993)=117.8
(Stock-Yogo 5% maximal IV relative bias) (13.91)
J-stat. of overidentication restriction Chi2(1)=.038
(P-value) (.8456)
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. * and ** denote signicance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
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Table 5: E¤ect of the marital regime on male-female yield di¤erential- Burkina Faso 1981-1983
1 2 3 4 5
OLS OLS OLS household OLS IV
household-crop-year household-crop-year & village-crop-year village-crop-year village-crop-year
xed e¤ect xed e¤ect xed e¤ect xed e¤ects xed e¤ect
Yield Yield Yield Fem*Poly Yield
Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err.
Fem -31.49** (6.63) -31.50** (8.96) -34.12** (9.474) .8060** (.0139) -65.76** (16.57)
Poly -30.69** (14.32) 16.22 (20.16)
Fem*Poly .0212 (9.387) 13.08 (9.846) 59.10** (21.85)
Size 1 149.3** (41.80) 149.3** (41.89) 126.7** (21.41) .0407 (.0286) 122.1** (20.82)
Size 2 76.91** (16.65) 76.91** (16.66) 48.07** (16.69) .0470** (.0220) 44.61** (10.98)
Size 3 69.40** (12.88) 69.40** (12.90) 40.94** (11.33) .0232 (.0218) 38.91** (9.207)
Size 4 34.17** (13.35) 34.17** (13.35) 23.86** (9.116) .0037 (.0212) 24.27 (9.350)
Size 6 -.4826 (7.809) -0.483 (7.830) -7.474 (6.343) .0334* (.0200) -6.958 (5.975)
Size 7 -13.47 (8.379) -13.47 (8.381) -16.70** (5.594) .0410** (.0174) -18.05** (5.998)
Size 8 -16.88** (7.488) -16.88** (7.489) -16.20** (6.445) .0246 (.0170) -16.57** (6.386)
Size 9 -28.83** (7.670) -28.83** (7.679) -26.33** (6.136) .0265* (.0160) -23.38** (6.862)
Size 10 -33.98** (7.696) -33.98 (7.696) -36.72** (6.590) .0230 (.0174) 27.94** (7.848)
Topo1 -37.77* (22.29) -37.77* (22.31) -22.09 (19.52) .0103 (29.33) -24.73 (17.93)
Topo2 -23.94 (23.01) -23.94 (23.04) -18.97 (18.14) -.0256 (.0248) -18.84 (15.92)
Topo3 -20.41 (22.69) 20.41 (22.72) -12.65 (18.44) -.0153 (.0227) -13.07 (16.27)
Topo4 -14.20 (27.64) -14.20 (27.65) -13.91 (20.39) -.0021 (.0210) -14.48 (17.34)
Comp. 1.873 (9.526) 1.873 (9.525) 7.685 (8.555) .0093 (.0129) 13.77* (8.075)
Village -1.966 (5.097) -1.966 (5.093) 4.232 (5.527) .0147 (.0098) 3.705 (4.506)
Rimaibe -.0372** (.0156)
Mossi -.1159** (.0172)
Fem*Rimaibe -.7297** (.0357)
Fem+Fem*Poly -31.48** (7.326) -21.03** (6.796) -6.666 (10.32)
Observations 3956 3956 3956 3937 3937
Angrist-Pischke F test of excluded instruments F(2,3746)=251.78
(Stock-Yogo 5% maximal IV relative bias) (13.91)
J-Stat. of overidentication restriction Chi2(1)=.259
(P-value) (.6107)
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. * and ** denote signicance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
Coe¢ cients on soil type are not reported for space reasons.
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Table 6: E¤ect of the marital regime on male-female yield di¤erential - Senegal 1989-1990
1 2 3 4 5
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
household-crop-year household-crop-year household & crop-year village-crop-year village-crop-year
xed e¤ect xed e¤ect xed e¤ect xed e¤ects xed e¤ect
Yield Yield Yield Fem*Poly Yield
Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err.
Fem -33.52** (7.485) -33.64** (7.840) -25.46** (9.999) .3550** (.0518) 2.310 (18.65)
Poly 34.82** (15.67)
WifeNum -.3640 (7.482)
Fem*WifeNum -.8677 (5.660)
Fem*Poly .2073 (10.96) -50.82* (29.40)
Size 1 73.14** (22.01) 73.13** (22.02) 59.84** (17.92) -.0179 (.0399) 55.87** (13.95)
Size 2 21.12** (9.380) 21.11** (9.464) 13.70 (9.216) .0320 (.0349) 21.45** (7.279)
Size 3 4.033 (8.558) 4.028 (8.601) -4.709 (8.344) .0151 (.0330) 5.148 (7.070)
Size 4 -7.831 (7.085) -7.841 (7.032) -14.63** (6.894) .0324 (.0372) -2.279 (7.062)
Size 6 -1.251 (8.409) -1.263 (8.434) -10.94 (8.428) .0577* (.0341) -5.465 (6.916)
Size 7 -8.357 (9.106) -8.365 (9.130) -11.12 (7.660) .0373 (.0323) -7.316 (7.078)
Size 8 -15.61* (8.313) -15.62* (8.298) -15.16** (7.055) .0414 (.0326) -10.74 (7.196)
Size 9 -20.39** (9.380) -20.40** (9.304) -21.93** (8.795) .0413 (.0348) -19.34** (7.820)
Size 10 -20.83** (7.968) -20.84** (7.957) -24.69** (7.885) .0463 (.0295) -21.32** (7.541)
Wolof .0671** (.0154)
Diakhanke -.0694* (.0388)
Fem*Wolof .3950** (.0613)
Fem+Fem*Poly -26.33** (6.982) -48.51** (13.43)
Observations 1258 1258 1258 1265 1265
Angrist-Pischke F test of excluded instruments F(2,1163)=19.07
(Stock-Yogo 5% maximal IV relative bias) (13.91)
J-Stat. of overidentication restriction Chi2(1)=.040
(P-value) (.8411)
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. * and ** denote signicance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
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Table 7: Fisrt-stage regression results for Poly - Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal
Benin Burkina Faso Senegal
OLS OLS OLS
xed e¤ect xed e¤ect xed e¤ect
village-crop-year village-crop-year village-crop-year
Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err.
Fem .2634** (.0316) .1878** (.0219) .0566 (.0580)
Size 1 -.0470 (.0298) -.0146 (.0423) -.0678 (.0703)
Size 2 -.0516 (.0361) .0123 (.0346) -.0717 (.0618)
Size 3 -.0338 (.0231) .0128 (.0325) -.0200 (.0598)
Size 4 .0164 (.0305) .0096 (.0314) -.0205 (.0693)
Size 6 .1585** (.0393) .0853** (.0311) .0921 (.0668)
Size 7 .0358 (.0281) .0950** (.0320) -.0418 (.0686)
Size 8 .1164** (.0243) .1315** (.0347) .0215 (.0699)
Size 9 .1165** (.0302) .1662** (.0357) .0003 (.0789)
Size 10 .2292** (.0273) .2335** (.0372) .0815 (.0692)
Irrigated -. 1204 (.1078)
Lowland -.0872** (.0338)
Distance .0143** (.0036)
Distance2 -.0002* (.0001)
Topo 1 -.0370 (.0521)
Topo 2 -.0770* (.0464)
Topo 3 -.0533 (.0454)
Topo 4 -.0197 (.0446)
Ethnic 1a .3308** (.0722) -.8235** (.0312) .4060** (.0451)
Ethnic 2b - .1377** (.0302) -.2622** (.0226) -.0732 (.1074)
Ethnic1*Fem -.2060** (.0300) -.0551 (.0430) .1206* (.0710)
Observations 5231 3937 1265
Angrist-Pischke F statistics F(2,4993)=13.92 F(2,3746)=341.42 F(2,1163)=27.17
(Stock-Yogo 5%) (13.91) (13.91) (13.91)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistics 9.542 291.2 20.20
Standard deviations are in parentheses. * and ** denote signicance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
a Benin: Adja, Burkina: Rimaibe, Senegal: Wolof
b Benin: Najo, Burkina: Mossi, Senegal: Diakhanke
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Table 8: More specications - Benin
OLS OLS OLS
OLS xed e¤ect xed e¤ect xed e¤ect
household household-year household-year-crop
Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err.
Without controls on plot characteristics
Fem -69.46 (17.37) -5.437 (15.09) -5.506 (15.28) -15.22 (17.15)
With controls on plot characteristics
Fem 92.65** (22.37) -81.68** (29.51) -73.31** (29.67) -40.16** (19.38)
Size 1 697.5** (112.1) 881.5** (165.5) 863.3** (163.32) 159.4** (51.00)
Size 2 109.5** (28.9) 193.7** (67.55) 215.6** (76.97) 111.1** (28.96)
Size 3 34.88** (13.58) 81.48** (23.53) 80.64** (24.32) 52.4** (12.66)
Size 4 20.55 (18.88) 41.2 (43.40) 39.81 (48.2) 37.82** (17.12)
Size 6 -33.43 (21.69) 15.73 (42.07) 15.81 (43.32) 31.42 (26.04)
Size 7 -17.66 (13.05) 8.290 (31.68) 10.46 (31.23) 17.73 (17.23)
Size 8 -35.09** (10.82) -96.93** (34.71) -92.05** (35.47) 6.669 (15.16)
Size 9 -53.83** (14.15) -48.03 (31.90) -21.46 (27.39) 4.538 (12.22)
Size 10 -48.84** (10.74) -230.9** (56.63) -225.8** (65.59) -17.26 (13.38)
Irrigated 555.6 (481.4) -346.2 (228.5) -373.6** (200.3) -22.18** (7.864)
Lowland 139.6* (72.91) -85.47 (148.8) -182.9 (121.2) -34.85 (49.35)
Distance 16.13** (6.683) 16.38* (9.696) 15.81* (8.277) 2.703 (2.531)
Distance2 -.402** (.1957) -.3970 (.2679 -.4055* (.2454) -.1700 (.1143)
Observ. 5231 5231 5231 5231
Standard deviations are in parentheses. * and ** denote signicance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
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Table 9: More specications - Burkina
OLS OLS OLS
OLS xed e¤ect xed e¤ect xed e¤ect
household household-year household-year-crop
Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err.
Without controls on plot characteristics
Fem 18.00** (5.557) 21.16** (7.736) 22.33** (7.576) -1.744 (4.322)
With controls on plot characteristics
Fem -27.34** (7.093) -37.58** (8.135) -37.78** (9.398) -31.49** (6.627)
Size 1 162.2** (17.37) 167.9** (17.35) 170.5** (17.18) 149.3** (41.80)
Size 2 58.16** (11.41) 61.91** (12.02) 67.52** (11.98) 76.91** (16.65)
Size 3 49.34** (9.772) 49.15** (9.295) 53.31** (10.24) 69.40** (12.88)
Size 4 25.41** (10.80) 24.99** (10.57) 27.99** (10.42) 34.17** (13.35)
Size 6 -15.98** (6.447) -23.03** (6.870) -17.48** (6.272) -0.483 (7.809)
Size 7 -25.99** (6.075) -29.73** (6.495) -24.94** (6.714) -13.47 (8.379)
Size 8 -31.37** (6.296) -33.63** (6.881) -31.85** (7.251) -16.88** (7.488)
Size 9 -41.51** (6.453) -49.64** (7.076) -44.43** (7.837) -28.83** (7.670)
Size 10 -40.11** (7.135) -49.40** (7.384) -46.82** (8.382) -33.98** (7.696)
Topo 1 -104.4** (19.65) -97.29** (23.88) -112.6** (25.17) -37.77* (22.29)
Topo 2 -102.1** (17.68) -103.2** (21.95) -109.3** (23.08) -23.94 (23.01)
Topo 3 -96.63** (18.00) -91.35** (20.28) -90.1** (22.07) -20.41 (22.69)
Topo 4 -76.61** (19.36) -73.61** (21.68) -70.99** (22.17) -14.20 (27.64)
Observ. 3956 3956 3956 3956
Standard deviations are in parentheses. * and ** denote signicance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
42
Table 10: More specications - Senegal
OLS OLS OLS
OLS xed e¤ect xed e¤ect xed e¤ect
household household-year household-year-crop
Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err. Coef. Std err.
Without controls on plot characteristics
Fem 2.305 (4.521) -3.053 (6.756) -5.369 (6.657) -19.05 (6.108)
With controls on plot characteristics
Fem -3.092 (4.893) -15.71** (7.361) -19.12** (7.285) -33.52** (7.485)
Size 1 37.11** (13.42) 41.95** (14.10) 43.37** (14.96) 73.14** (22.01)
Size 2 10.95 (7.328) 9.124 (9.096) 6.500 (11.00) 21.12** (9.377)
Size 3 11.02 (7.372) -4.795 (9.713) -8.370 (11.36) 4.033 (8.558)
Size 4 1.782 (7.452) -14.22 (7.992) -13.96 (8.896) -7.831 (7.085)
Size 6 .5447 (6.845) -10.58 (9.909) -12.67 (12.36) -1.251 (8.409)
Size 7 -9.515 (6.954) -17.99** (8.226) -19.53** (9.844) -8.357 (9.106)
Size 8 4.213 (7.090) -15.95* (8.691) -21.27** (9.697) -15.61* (8.313)
Size 9 -7.219 (7.057) -22.48** (9.267) -26.60** (10.98) -20.39** (9.380)
Size 10 -7.975 (6.935) -28.51** (8.796) -31.73** (9.801) -20.83** (7.968)
Observ. 1258 1258 1258 1258
Standard deviations are in parentheses. * and ** denote signicance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
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